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Although I will be graduating from a ‘Comparative Studies’ department, this will 
be my first attempt at a comparative paper.  Perhaps it was the strong influence of an 
anthropologist who was prone to a particularistic point of view, but in the past, I have had 
a fairly dismissive attitude toward comparison.  In every one of my classes I was 
somehow able to find a ‘particularist’ method of studying and writing, and thus often 
went about my research in a deliberately non-comparative way.  I recently realized I had 
yet to explore and/or attempt to write any sort of comparative paper myself and as to not 
completely reject comparison before even trying, I decided to use this undergraduate 
thesis as a means to explore the topic and write my first ‘comparative’ paper.   Because 
paper will focus on the utility of using comparative methods when studying “religion” 
and “culture”, I think a note on these terms is necessary.  These words have a history of 
both being slippery and controversial in terms of their definitions and usages.  Many 
religious and cultural studies scholars have spent much time on their definitions, but for 
now, I propose that we bypass those discussions and use a standard conceptualization of 
them both.     
This thesis is set up in two parts.  The first part explores the scholarly debate 
about the utility and necessity of comparative methods and the second part will consist of 
my own comparative projects.  The hope is that, at the end, I will be able to answer 
certain questions about comparative methods and techniques.  For me, the most important 
questions that need to be answered are: What is the point of setting up research in an 
overtly comparative way?   Does comparison always have to lead to generalizations and 
universals?  If comparing is about similarities and differences, are we looking for 
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instances of similarity to show universality, or are we looking for differences to show 
uniqueness?  Is it possible  to discuss universals and historical context together?  Is there 
any correlation between the topic of research (i.e. religion) and skepticism about the 
utility of comparison?  Is there any correlation between methodology of research and 
skepticism about the utility of comparison?   If one decides to write a comparative paper, 
how does one ‘do’ it?   
If I am able to answer these questions, I think it will allow for greater clarity and 
perhaps new ideas about the utility of cross-cultural comparison.  In the first part of the 
thesis, I will begin by looking at how scholars are discussing comparative methods and 
examine how they are answering the above posited questions.  Then in the second part, 
by attempting to write a comparative paper of my own, I will try to find my own answers 















Part I.  Thinking Comparison 
 
In my experience, most scholars with whom I have come into contact give the 
impression that comparative methods have gone ‘out of style’.  The trend seems to have 
shifted away from comparative techniques and toward the particular, which, to a lot of 
people, is a shift away from similarity and toward difference.  This first chapter looks at 
some of the scholars who are actively championing the merits and utility of using 
comparative techniques to study religion.  In 2001, the journal NUMEN devoted an entire 
issue to the topic of comparison, a forum for scholars who wished to defend comparison 
from all the critiques and criticisms.  My goal is that, by looking at what the scholars who 
are using comparative methods are saying, I will be able to answer the above mentioned 
questions and better understand what is at stake in the debate about comparison.   
Robert Segal: Generalizations, Universals and Comparison 
The first article I would like to explore is Robert Segal’s “In Defense of the 
Comparative Method”.  In this article he discusses the relationship of comparison to 
generalizations.  One of the foremost criticisms about comparative methods is that 
comparative projects focus on similarities and thus share the goal of showing that 
everyone is the same.  When the similarities are spotlighted, the differences can come to 
be seen as insignificant.  Clifford Geertz, one of the well known critics of comparative 
methods, argues against comparison for just this reason: because comparative projects too 
often have generalizations as the final outcome.  Geertz sees these universals and 
generalizations as inaccurate, banal and/or empty.  He writes,  
Theoretical formulations hover so low over the interpretations they 
govern that they don’t make much sense or hold much interest apart 
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from them….[S]tated independently of their applications, they seem 
either commonplace or vacant (Segal, 342-3).     
 
To Geertz, what matters is not necessarily what humans have in common as much as the 
differences.   
[T]he notion that the essence of what it means to be human is most 
clearly revealed in those features of human culture that are universal 
rather than in those that are distinctive to this people or that is a 
prejudice we are not necessarily obliged to share.  Is it in grasping 
such general facts—that man has everywhere some of “religion”—or 
in grasping the richness of this religious phenomenon or that—
Balinese trance or Indian ritualism, Aztec human sacrifice or Zuni 
rain-dancing—that we grasp him?  Is the fact that “marriage” is 
universal (if it is) as penetrating a comment on what we are as the facts 
concerning Himalayan polyandry, or those fantastic Australian 
marriage rules, or the elaborate bride-price systems of Bantu Africa? 
(Segal, 343).   
 
Therefore, for Geertz, it matters less that something like marriage is a universal quality of 
human life, and more that the particulars of a certain place and a certain point in time can 
allow for a better understanding of that particular situation.  Geertz is in opposition to any 
project that sets out to show similarity across cultures.  Nonetheless, Segal points out that 
it is not necessarily the comparative method to which Geertz is opposed but “What counts 
is that his opposition to generalizations is his opposition to the comparative method” 
(Segal, 344).   
In regards to other critiques about comparison, Segal notes that others have 
criticized comparative methods either for generalizing prematurely or for generalizing at 
all.   In response to the notion that comparison leads to a premature generalization, Segal 
writes: 
 Comparisons are always considered provisional, not conclusive.  
Comparisons are subject to correction or abandonment, as new facts 
arise.  The failure of existing generalizations is scarcely an argument 
against generalizations per se….Because generalizations are 
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recognized as tentative, the comparative method does not generalize 
prematurely (Segal, 351).   
 
Segal maintains that the critique that comparative methods always end in generalizations 
or universals is actually a result of scholars not realizing the significance of similarities 
and differences, and not a result of the methods being innately flawed.   To Segal, 
comparative methods are capable of illuminating both similarities and differences.  It is 
just that, to date, most comparativists have chosen to focus on the similarities.   
Another point that Segal addresses comes in regards to the particular versus 
general.  Melford Spiro, a supporter of particularism, wrote: 
The distinctive anthropological approach, the source of its strength and 
weakness alike, is a contextual one.  Social phenomena can only be 
understood, according to this methodological stance, in their historical 
uniqueness, that is, as the products of culturally parochial forms, 
structures, and processes.  Similarly, the goal of such studies is to 
explain why the people under investigation differ from other peoples 
with respect to the subject of one’s inquiry, rather than to discover a 
set of principles that might explain the range of phenomena of which it 
is only one variant (Segal, 341).   
 
But to Segal, the idea of ever having a complete picture or ever being capable to 
allow for the complexities of a ‘particular’ time and place is problematic.  He thus views 
the selectiveness of a generalist and a particularist as being of “only one of degree” 
(Segal, 352), by which he means that generalists must often pick elements to compare but 
particularists are also faced with the infinite complexity of situations, and thus must also 
select what they want to research and write about.  Later Segal writes,  
The comparative method is often confused with the assumption of 
universals—as if it stands committed to similarities not merely across 
cultures but across all cultures.  In actuality, the method requires the 
search for multiple instances of a phenomenon but allows for the 
discovery of even just one.  Still, unless the explanation given of 
people X would apply to any other people in kindred conditions who 
did offer these sacrifices, the explanation fails to explain even the sole 
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case to date of people X.  In short, the way to understand people X is 
not merely by myopically studying them more and more.  It is also by 
studying other peoples as well (Segal, 358).   
 
Segal is insistent that comparison should only be seen as useful or not useful, not 
right or wrong or too broad or too narrow.  For Segal there is no need to change 
comparison or comparative methods; neither is there any need to be critical of those 
comparing; the problem merely lies in the critics’ misunderstanding and misuse of the 
comparisons and the generalizations.   And therefore, to Segal, comparative projects do 
not necessarily end with the general or universal.  He writes, “The comparative method is 
itself neutral.  It is a tool, to be used by either particularists or universalists” (Segal, 348).    
Benson Saler: The Inevitability of Comparison 
Benson Saler, unlike Segal, is critical of the close relations of comparison and 
universals.  He is weary of universals but sees comparison as an inevitable aspect of 
human cognition and unavoidable in scholarship.  Consequently, in his article, “Some 
Suggestions for Improving the Inevitable”, he proceeds to lay out ways to improve upon 
comparative methods.  He wants to give an alternative way of thinking about comparison 
that will not necessarily always end with universals.  As to why comparison is inevitable, 
he writes:  
Comparison is vital in certain of the activities of the mind-brain.  We 
regularly monitor the world, and in doing so we creatively and 
selectively compare newly encountered phenomena to established 
representational structures.  Comparative processes are thus of crucial 
importance in cognition (Saler, 268). 
 
For Saler, because it is impossible not to use comparison in researching, there is 
no point discussing whether or not comparing has any utility; he moves directly to how 
we can improve techniques of comparing and also improve upon the type of conclusions 
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we draw from these comparisons.   He discusses the “problem of universals” (Saler, 271) 
in philosophy and writes that although the universals that philosophers discuss differ 
from those in social sciences, he sees the same problem as pertaining to both, namely, 
“How do we justify applying the same general term to a diversity of particulars?” (Saler, 
271).    
Saler agrees that often by positing universals, comparisons can be too simple, not 
allowing for the complexities that exist within situations, and thus universals are not just 
to be ignored, but rather something to be worked with and improved upon.  After looking 
at Donald Brown’s discussion of universals, Saler concludes that although he agrees with 
Brown’s supposition that universals are always based upon limited cases, he still cannot 
embrace them.  Saler writes: 
Now, despite Brown’s sophistication and general good sense, I am 
uncomfortable with the notion of human universals…..[I will be] 
proposing that instead of talking about human universals we speak 
about natural resemblances, and that instead of attempting to identify 
cultural universals we look for cultural resemblances (Saler, 270).   
 
The important shift for Saler is that we should be looking for “natural 
resemblances”, not universals.  He quotes the philosopher H.H. Price on the critical 
difference between universals and resemblances: 
The question is, what sort of a structure does a class have?  That is 
where the two philosophies differ.  According to the Philosophy of 
Universals, a class is so to speak a promiscuous or equalitarian 
assemblage.  All its members have, as it were, the same status in it.  
All of them are instances of the same universal…But in the Philosophy 
of Resemblances a class has a more complex structure than 
this…Every class has, as it were, a nucleus, an inner ring of key 
members, consisting of a small group of standard objects or exemplars 
….[and] every other member of the class should resemble the class 
exemplars as closely as they resemble one another (Saler, 272).   
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Saler wants to shift the question of “What might be human universals?” to “What might 
be significant natural resemblances among humans?” (Saler, 272).  Besides allowing for 
comparisons to have greater complexity, subtlety and become more realistic, Saler notes 
that resemblance theory seems to be supported by cognitive science in terms of 
“prototype effects” and connectionist theory.  The importance of looking for natural 
resemblances and not universals is that resemblances not only allows for both similarity 
and difference, but also accents the broad spectrum of these similarities and differences.  
In this way comparison allows for the diversity of the situations while also giving us a 
way to discuss the similarities without jumping to the conclusion of universality.   
While the term “universal” may connote something “out there” that is 
independent of cognitive mediation, “resemblance” suggests a 
judgment that someone makes, and makes within a mediating 
framework (Saler, 273).    
 
 The main objective of Saler’s article is, for one, to show that comparison is 
inevitable in cognition and thus should be seen as unavoidable in scholarship and, for 
two, that because of its inevitability, comparative methods need improvement in order to 
avoid projects concluding with universals.  For Saler, the way to evade universals is to 
look for human resemblances.    
Jeppe Sinding Jensen: ‘Conceptualism’ as an answer 
  “Universals, General Terms and the Comparative Study of Religion” by Jeppe 
Sinding Jensen begins by discussing how much of the anti-comparison, anti-universal 
attitudes of today’s scholars arise from looking at earlier versions of comparison, seeing 
or determining that these studies were flawed, and then quickly dismissing any type of 
comparative method.  He writes,  
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Against detailed empirical studies comparative studies are always 
bound to get something wrong, to be too general and superficial.  In 
that sense the critique from particularists and empiricists is justified, 
but such critique may serve the wrong purpose and be based on the 
wrong premises (Jensen, 239).  
  
Similar to Saler, Jensen is both concerned with the definition of universals and also 
shows how scholars of religion might look to philosophy for help.  He borrows a 
definition from philosophy:  
A universal is a property or relation that can be instanced or instantiated, 
by a number of different particular things: each yellow thing provides an 
instance of the property of yellowness, and each square thing the 
property of being square.  The things covered by a universal are thus 
similar in some respect.  The general questions asked about universals 
include: are they discovered or invented?  How are we to think of 
something that has itself no spatial position, yet is instanced at many 
places and times?  What is the relation of instantiation?  Can sharing the 
same property be analyzed in terms of resemblance?  How does the 
mind perceive the general property as well as the particular instance? 
(Jensen, 242).   
 
Where Jensen is highly distinctive is in his notion that studies of religion are 
actually dependent upon generalizations and universals. In this way he is very different 
from Saler.  His article’s main objective, then, is to demystify universals and illustrate 
their necessity in the study of religion.   
For Jensen, all the problems related to universals are themselves products of 
history, and thus he points out that the ability for humans even to make history is actually 
also reliant upon universals.  He does not think that universals equate to identity, but that 
universals just mean similarity, and are a place to begin with comparison.  He writes,  
The acceptance of the existence of surface differences among 
societies, cultures, and religious traditions does not necessarily entail a 
surrender to doctrines of incommensurability, incompatibility, or 
comparability on the part of the scholar.  One of the problems in the 
discussions concerning universals is that they have frequently been 
considered the opposite of history, namely “eternal”, but such dualism 
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is itself a product of history.  It is then more interesting to attempt to 
explain why it is that the human ability to have or to make history in 
itself requires the existence of universals.  Anything that is historically 
specific and culturally relative is so only because it is a human project 
and therefore comparable—even the most historicist and relativist 
study is only possible on the premises of the “psychic unity” of 
humankind.  Universals warrant comparability, but they do not entail 
or imply identity (Jensen, 241).    
 
Jensen finds the problematic manners of Western thought at fault for the dilemmas in the 
conceptualizing universals.  “The commonsense idea that ‘universals’ are identical things 
that must be discoverable all over the world is an illusion produced by the ‘reifying’ 
modes of ‘Western’ thought” (Jensen, 247).   Jensen disagrees with Saler insofar as using 
natural resemblances is an alternative to universals.  To him they are both metaphysical 
and thus ‘universal’ does not at all imply something ‘out there’ any more than a natural 
resemblance.   
Thus universals are not empirical objects operating in empirical 
mechanisms, but they are the properties of entities, complexes, 
processes, functions, and structures.  They are the predicates that may 
apply to more than one thing and none of these predicates is a 
“physical” item of the world.  I shall not elaborate on such concepts as 
“identity”, “class”, “resemblance”, “difference”—for what are they if 
not metaphysical?(Jensen, 247-8).   
 
In the debate about universals, the two ends of the spectrum for Jensen are (a) the 
position that universals are either pre-existing and thus discoveries that allow for us to see 
the similarities across humans or (b) the position that there are no universals and thus 
particulars have nothing in common besides how we label them.  Neither of these is 
appealing to Jensen and thus he offers a middle ground of “conceptualism” (Jensen, 255).  
The idea of “conceptualism” is that universals are concepts, not real entities that 
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somehow exist ‘out there’, but that we can and should use them as they can be useful in 
our daily lives for communication and understanding.   
Since Kant we have been told that we know not what things are “in 
themselves” thus, human universals concerning the knowledge about 
things are not in the things but in our classifications of them; they are 
in our categories and concepts, they are present to us only in our 
generalized terms and interpretations (Jensen, 249).    
 
To Jensen, it makes no sense to ask whether funeral rites “really exist” or whether 
this ritual or that is “really” a funeral rite (Jensen, 260).  In this way, it also beside the 
point to discuss the existence of universals, what matters is how we conceptualize them 
and then how the conceptualizations can help us make sense of our interpretations of the 
world.      
William Paden: Human Behaviors 
“Universals Revisited: Human Behaviors and Cultural Variations” by William 
Paden is another article concerned with the idea of universals.  He considers the 
weaknesses of comparative methods to be (a), that the categories chosen for cross-
cultural comparison are often impositions and (b), that any valid generalization must be 
so abstract that it is either obvious or becomes vacuous.  The key problem that has 
existed in the past with comparison is that when comparison leads to universals, the 
universals themselves are cultural categories.  When looking at the universality of 
cultural categories, he writes  
Classical phenomenological comparativism, for its part, has 
bequeathed an enormous body of thematics, but a thematics tied to 
cultural categories, meanings and institutions.  The points of 
comparability are religious topics—that is, classifications of kinds of 
religious belief and behavior.  Not surprisingly, the patterns—like 
“deity” or “savior”—then become problematic when used as points of 
cross-cultural reference.  They remain on the surface of culture, bound 
to their own folk origins and prototypes (Paden, 277).   
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Therefore, it is not with universals that the problem arises for Paden, but actually in the 
kind of universals posited.  Cultural categories are always culturally constructed and 
therefore become very problematic when used as generalizations across cultures.   In 
order to avoid such problematic use of universals, Paden wants to shift the direction of 
the universals posited away from culturally constructed categories and toward human 
behavior.  To Paden, human behavioral universals eliminate any problematic assumptions 
that stem from cultural categories.  He writes,  
Still, the question does not go away: How to conceive of what recurs 
in human life, or in religious life?  How can “difference” be found 
unless it is different with regard to something that is otherwise similar 
or shared?  How to find secular, post-theological bases for 
comparative perspective in the wake of poststructuralist infatuation 
with diversity and conceptual reflexivity?....I will build upon the 
primary idea that we have regarded the comparativism problem too 
much from the point of view of cultural categories, and that we will do 
well to reconsider the uses of a broadened notion of human behaviors 
underlying and shared by all cultures (Paden, 276-7).   
 
Though he knows that this will be difficult for postmodernists to accept, Paden 
notes that it will be “obvious” to natural scientists, who view humans “as a singular 
phylogenetic kind, with common genetic programming, social predispositions, and 
infrastructural cultural behaviors” (Paden, 277).   When we use cultural categories to 
compare, each category is obviously bound to a culture, and one cannot escape one’s own 
culture when looking at another, and thus, generalizations based on such categories are 
very problematic.  To Paden, this predicament disappears when looking at human 
behavior, 
 This approach involves identifying continuities in the kinds of things 
people do as humans—rather than patterns in the beliefs or 
“meanings” they project as religious insiders (Paden, 278).   
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To Paden, this idea works insofar as what humans share cross culturally is their 
genetic make-up; this genetic make-up causes humans to share common behaviors, but 
not necessarily share common meanings or beliefs, which are a resultant of culture.   
Paden looks to alter the way universals are viewed and used.  He writes:  
While there are many ways to find patterns that underlie culture, here I 
focus on the broad idea that common to all sociocultural life is a wide 
network of universal kinds of behaviors and behavioral dispositions 
upon which or from which religious life builds its activities and worlds 
(Paden, 279).   
 
After listing some types of universal behaviors Paden points out, that to him, 
when using these behaviors as cross-cultural comparison, the comparisons are not 
vacuous or intrusive.  They are not vacuous as each type of behavior has a history and 
also not intrusive as it is only the behavior that is similar; the way these behaviors are 
done and the meaning assigned to them is where the difference becomes significant.   
Identifying comparable forms of behavior is then a pivot point for 
finding and examining the differential variations, contrasts, and 
cultural workings and reworking of those common behaviors.  In other 
words comparative religion focuses on how religious cultures construct 
pasts, defend identities, negotiate reciprocities, distinguish kin and 
non-kin, endow objects with prestige, mark significant times, 
discipline the mind, experiment with consciousness, engage linguistic 
objects as though they were entities, and map their universes…Thus 
comparative perspective here moves back and forth between the 
continuity of common functions and the contrastable differentials of 
historical specificity and types (Paden, 285).    
 
Paden cites Saler’s idea of natural resemblances, and wants to show that 
universals do not necessarily rule out the significance of particulars.  For example, 
Quaker meetinghouses, Hopi kivas and Gothic cathedrals all use space differently, but all 
share the idea of “making sacred space” (Paden, 286).   Paden says that, although this 
model directly addresses criticisms of universals, there are other models that begin with 
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particulars, “Thus one could set up comparison in either direction: similar function, 
different acts; or similar acts, different functions” (Paden, 288).   
In Paden’s article, he also discusses how universals should not and cannot lie 
outside of history.  One scholar who almost always is discussed in terms of historicizing 
(or the lack thereof) is Mircea Eliade.  He is usually used as an example of someone who 
has erred in his attempt of comparing people and cultures outside of context and history.  
Paden wants to show how his new and improved technique for comparison leaves no 
room for this Eliadian style of context-lacking comparisons.  He writes  
Thus, comparative perspective here moves back and forth between the 
continuity of common functions and the contrastable differentials of 
historical specificity and context….Eliadian versions of sacred space, 
for example, are typically illustrative of commonality and sameness of 
motif.  By contrast, a reformed comparativism does not limit the 
variations on the theme to just representing expressions of the theme 
but also studies them to learn from their sociocultural, contextual 
differences (Paden, 286).   
  
Hugh Urban: Making a Place to Stand 
In this section, through focusing on Hugh B. Urban’s article “Making a Place to 
Take a Stand: Jonathan Z. Smith and the Politics and Poetics of Comparison”, I want to 
explore the issue of the politics involved in comparing.  In his article, Urban looks at and 
critiques Smith’s idea that by using comparison to study religion, scholars have no place 
to stand, that is, no point from which they can be centered.  Smith sees comparison as 
something playful, to be done as an exercise that can possibly bring to light new aspects 
and draw out new sides of things, but not as anything overtly serious in nature.   
For Smith, in short, comparison is best done in the “playful” modes 
of metaphor, irony and comedy—as a clever smile or a pun that 
helps us to see the world in new ways (Urban, 341).   
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To Urban, this is a dangerous and naïve point of view; he agrees with Talal Asad 
in that there are and have been serious implications of these seemingly uninterested 
scholarly works and how these works, in their Enlightenment origins, have been used in 
imperializing projects.   Urban writes that what he finds troubling about Smith’s work is 
the lack of responsibility he takes for the influence that scholarly work can have:  
Second and more importantly, however, I will also suggest that a 
deeper, more troubling issue lies at the heart of Smith’s work—namely 
the question of his own normative commitment or his “place on which 
to stand”.  There is throughout Smith’s oeuvre a troubling ambivalence 
regarding the role of the scholar’s own personal interests and their 
effect on his work (Urban, 342).   
 
Also, Urban contends that Smith’s idea of the ‘stance-less position’ of a scholar, can and 
should be seen as problematic.   
In contrast to Smith’s “placeless comparison”, I will argue instead that 
the comparative study of religions should be—and in fact always 
already is—an interested comparison, one which is always rooted in 
the scholar’s own political interests and normative commitments, and 
which is always in one way or another deployed in the service of those 
commitments (Urban, 343).   
 
Urban argues that in partaking in the comparison of religion, we must take a 
stand, meaning that we must all  
admit, articulate and defend our own personal positions in the world, 
while at the same time subjecting them to relentless self-reflection, 
criticism and the possibility of change (Urban, 343).    
 
To Urban, the question that needs to be asked is whether or not the scholar can 
avoid taking a stand, whether anyone can remain detached and objective from her work 
and thus fully bracket out biases.  When Smith says that there is no place for the historian 
of religions to stand, he is saying that not only do we not need to, but also that we cannot, 
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choose a place to stand.  For Urban, if there is no place for the scholar to stand, then he 
doesn’t see clearly any point of doing these comparisons (Urban, 360).   
Urban sees part of taking a stand is for scholars to state clearly their goals and 
affiliations.  Urban writes that a lot of his work is derived from Pierre Bourdieu and 
Michel Foucault, and thus by way of self-disclosure he explains, “Human beings, it 
seems to me, are fundamentally interested creatures, who are engaged in an ongoing 
struggle for both economic and symbolic resources within various conflicting social 
fields” (Urban, 371).   The scholar needs to take a stand before anything can come from 
the comparisons.   
 The key to a genuinely useful scholarly comparison, therefore, would 
not simply lie in revealing some mysterious and striking similarity 
between two diverse, otherwise unconnected phenomena; nor would it 
even lie simply, in Smith’s terms, in a playful, ironic metaphorical 
juxtaposition of phenomena, which delights in their incongruities and 
suggests new insights.  Still more importantly, I would argue, such a 
comparison would also demand that we admit, render explicit and 
justify our own inescapable “place” in relation to our data, that we 
acknowledge and defend our own personal, political and normative 




After examining these articles and before attempting to write a comparative paper, 
I would like to try and situate myself in response to the questions in the introduction and 
what issues these scholars have raised.  Now looking back at my dismissive attitude 
toward comparison, I can see that what was often the cause of me not taking comparative 
methods seriously was the idea that comparative projects always led to universals and 
generalizations.  I thought the only type of comparative project would be an Eliadian or 
Joseph Campbell style, in which the aim is to show that what everyone is doing is 
 18
fundamentally the same. To me, when scholars attempt to situate projects outside of 
historical context to show ‘sameness’, they do not actually accomplish anything more 
than a ‘feel good’ movie, namely, they make you feel good for a while but then must 
come back to the context of your particular situation.  In examining the articles above, I 
am now comforted by the idea that a comparative project can focus on differences and 
thus do not have to lead to some conclusion about how we are all really the ‘same’.  I 
agree with Geertz in that what makes any particular situation interesting is how it differs 
from other particular situations.  But in order to know about the differences, I appreciate 
Segal’s point that there must be a comparative starting point.  Segal writes, “In short, the 
way to understand people X is not merely by myopically studying them more and more.  
It is also by studying other peoples as well” (Segal, 358).  For if there are no similarities, 
if the situations have nothing in common, then the differences are mostly meaningless.   
Saler also makes this point with his natural resemblance theory.  The importance of 
looking for natural resemblances and not universals is that resemblances not only allows 
for both similarity and difference, but also because they accent the broad spectrum of 
these similarities and differences.  In this way comparison allows for appreciation of the 
diversity of the situations while also giving us a way to discuss the similarities without 
immediately leading to the conclusion of universality.   
Therefore, I do not think it is accurate to characterize all comparative projects as 
necessarily focusing on the similarities.  It is not the comparing per se that leads to 
generalizations, but rather the comparer’s motives.  Through looking at the scholars 
above, it is clear that there are many different types of projects, each with its own starting 
point and intentions.  Since, as I have stated above, I have no desire to partake in the 
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project of showing how everyone is the same, a comparative project for me would likely 
be focusing on the differences.  In this way, I would want to start with the similarities; for 
example, in the ethnographic research I have been doing, what drew me to the women is 
that they are both about the same age and grew up in China during the Mao era and now 
consider themselves Christians.  Although what drew me to the women in the first place 
were their similarities, I hope in the process of comparing them to be able to draw out 
their differences.  I think that by finding differences, I will be able to highlight the 
complexities and uniqueness of their particular situations.   
  Another recurrent theme to emerge from the articles above in support of using 
comparative methods when studying religion is the value of looking at the way human 
cognition works and showing that, since we use comparison to locate and/or categorize 
everything we come across in our lives, scholars necessarily must use comparison when 
studying anything, including religion.  Saler’s main idea is that since we cannot and do  
not avoid using comparison when monitoring the world, we might as well realize the 
necessity of comparison in studying religion and then work on improving comparative 
methods.  He writes,   
Schema theory and other facets of the cognitive sciences remind us 
that certain of the intellectual processes of the human brain are 
crucially comparative.  In that comparison in ineluctable in 
monitoring the world and in coming to understand newly 
encountered events, then perhaps we can consciously improve on 
what is cognitively inevitable  (Saler, 267).    
 
Saler sees the attempt of postmodernists to avoid the general in favor of the 
particular as an impossible task: “For the general is intimately associated with the 
comparative and the comparative cannot be eschewed” (Saler, 268).  Segal echoes these 
sentiments when he writes,  
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Sixth and most important, comparison is not merely permissible but 
indispensable.  To understand any phenomenon, however specific, is to 
identify it and to account for it.  To identify something is to place it in a 
category, and to account for it is to account for the category of which it 
is a member.  Both procedures are thus inescapably comparativist 
(Segal, 352).   
 
I am not yet convinced of this idea that, since we use comparison to make sense 
of the world, then we must use comparison in scholarly writing about the world.  I agree 
that humans use comparison constantly in monitoring the world, and thus while doing 
fieldwork I don’t think anyone would argue that there isn’t a constant comparing of what 
you are experiencing for the first time with what you are accustomed; but, at the same 
time, the comparisons we use to make sense of the world are not set, not structured 
comparisons.  When I am making sense of the world, the comparisons I make are 
constantly shifting, constantly being rearranged and being used at different levels.  
Rarely, if ever, would I only be comparing two things or two women like the structure of 
the comparative paper I will write in the next section.   Thus I would argue that the 
comparisons happening at the level of bringing new experiences into the realm of those 
experiences we have already had and understand are very different than structuring a 
paper comparatively.  Therefore, by saying that we should use comparative methods in 
scholarship because we use comparison in our everyday monitoring of the world, doesn’t 
convince me of the inevitability of comparative methods.   
In response to Hugh Urban’s criticisms of Smith and Smith’s notion of 
comparison as play, I am still unsure where to situate myself.  I agree with Smith’s idea 
that comparisons are to be used as a tool to shift through information, not necessarily to 
find or produce truth statements.  Although, as Urban could potentially point out, just 
because scholars agree to not accept the generalizations that come from comparisons as 
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truth statements, does not at all mean others will do the same.  It is with regards to the 
idea of politics in scholarly work that I am still unsure as to the whereabouts of my 
position.  In one moment I find myself on very parallel ground with Smith, that we need 
not take ourselves too seriously, and a great way to make sure we don’t take ourselves 
too seriously is by treating comparison and our scholarly work as a playful exercise, 
meant only to enable to us to revisit and look upon things from new perspectives and with 
new insight.  But in looking at what Asad, Urban and countless other scholars have 
written, I can’t help but feel somewhat sympathetic to the notion that by treating our 
work as nonpolitical we are not being nonpolitical, we are just potentially turning a blind 
eye to the effects our work has and how these projects “have been inevitably intertwined 
with the forces of political, cultural and economic colonialism” (Urban, 369).  For, even 
if in my work I do not take myself seriously, do not pretend to have any motive other 
than to compare playfully, I still have no control over whom could potentially take it 
seriously and then act accordingly.   Urban writes, “if the academic study of religion can 
be construed as a form of ‘play’, then it is surely a very serious, often dangerous form of 
deep play” (Urban, 369).   Hopefully, after writing the following comparative essays, I 
will be able to situate myself within this debate about the seriousness of comparative 
scholarship.   
Looking ahead to the next part of the thesis, a question that arises is how to go 
about doing a comparative paper.  In Jonathan Z. Smith’s “In Comparison a Magic 
Dwells” he explores just this topic.  He begins by quoting the Stranger from Elea in that 
“A cautious man should above all be on his guard against resemblances; they are a very 
slippery sort of thing” (Smith, 29).  Smith’s article points out how limited the options are 
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for comparative methodology.  After outlining the four basic styles of comparison, 
ethnographic, encyclopaedic, morphological, and evolutionary, Smith first takes us 
through why each style or method is inadequate and then writes, “The only option 
appears to be no option at all” (Smith, 29).  To Smith this is an embarrassment as 
historians of religion have “yet to develop the responsible alternative: the integration of a 
complex notion of pattern and system with an equally complex notion of history” (Smith, 
34).  Smith is haunted by this Wittgenstein quote:  
But isn’t the same at least the same?  We seem to have an infallible 
paradigm of identity in the identity of a thing with itself…Then are 
two things the same when they are what one thing is?  And how am I 
to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things? 
(Smith, 40). 
 
He concludes his article with the somber notion that what we have now as comparative 
methods do not offer any promising results.  Unfortunately, he does not make any 
suggestions as to how to improve comparison, but just finishes with an unsatisfied need 
for the improvement.   
I agree with Smith in that there has not been any precedent set for how to do 
comparison.  But, I am disappointed, that although Smith convincingly points out the 
lacking in good models to use, he nevertheless does not offer any suggestions or new 
ideas on methodology.  Hugh Urban, also unsatisfied with Smith, writes,  
While he has persuasively deconstructed virtually all past models, he 
has not yet given us any kind of well-developed new method of 
comparison to take their place…Smith has never systematically 
worked out a coherent method for comparison or a rigorous means of 
evaluating its results (Urban, 341).   
 
Unfortunately for the student of comparative methods, it appears we are left 
without much guidance as to how to go about our projects.   
 23
One question that the academic literature does not really address is whether or not 
comparison is methodologically oriented, meaning does one’s method (i.e. fieldwork or 
textual analysis) dictate the utility of comparison?  Is there any correlation between doing 
fieldwork versus doing text-based work and skepticism toward comparison?   Hopefully 
at the end of writing a comparative paper, I will be able to personally assess these 



















Part II.  
Doing Comparison  
Upon researching and writing the first part of the thesis, I was able to acquire a lot 
of knowledge on both sides of the arguments about the utility of comparison.  Not only 
do I understand different scholars’ ideas about comparative projects, I have also had the 
opportunity to explore where I think I stand on some of the issues.  Now that I have a 
basic knowledge of what other scholars are discussing in relation to comparison, and 
recognize my personal stance, my goal is to after actually doing a comparative work, 
again be self reflexive as to my views on comparative methods.   
The original plan for this part of my thesis was to do an ethnographic fieldwork 
project with two Chinese women, of whom both currently reside in Columbus, Ohio.  I 
encountered some difficulties in doing the ethnographic fieldwork and ultimately had to 
alter the structure of this second part.  As the comparative paper relied heavily on my 
ethnographic work, when I ran into problems scheduling time to meet with the women, 
the progress was disappointingly slow.  The hindrances I encountered seem to have to do 
with the involvedness of fieldwork, namely, I am not sure that one can do fieldwork 
successfully if it does not have all of your attention.  Therefore, the frequency and 
number of visits I had with each of the women was not adequate to feel comfortable 
writing about them.  My research hinged on a relatively few meetings with the women, 
which I came to realize was very problematic.  Also, when some of the meetings fell 
through, the impact on my data was fairly dramatic.  When I should have already begun 
the comparative writing part of the thesis, I still felt I had very little information about the 
women, and thus wasn’t really able to move forward.   
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As the entire reason for the thesis began with my desire to work with comparative 
methods and draw my own conclusions about their utility by writing a comparative paper, 
I was not willing to give up on writing my own comparative piece.  Therefore, I decided 
to move forward with attempting to compare the women from the ethnographic work, but 
also added two new parts to the comparative half of this thesis: (a) a text-based 
comparison and (b) a comparison of the ethnographic comparison and the text-based 
comparison.  Besides allowing for me to continue with the doing of a comparative paper, 
by adding these parts I will also be able to explore more thoroughly the question of 
whether the methodology of fieldwork and textual analysis influences the effectiveness 
and appropriateness of comparison.   
Ethnographic-based Comparison  
 Before I begin to compare the two women with whom I talked and had e-mail 
correspondence, I would like to emphasize that I proceed cautiously.  I do not intend to 
give the impression that I have adequate information or understanding of the women to 
write conclusively about them.  Nonetheless, based on what I do know and the 
correspondences we have had, I am going to try and do comparison.  The goal is not to 
come to some concretized notion of who these women are or what role religion has 
played in their lives, but more that through comparing their lives examine if we are left 
with something more, some deeper understanding than if I had just written about one of 
them particularly.   
Beginning first with these women’s backgrounds, I will try to explore and 
compare (a) the history of how they became involved with Christianity, (b) problems that 
arose from their involvement in Christianity, and (c) how their involvement and beliefs in 
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Christianity have changed their lives.  The hope is that through the comparison, the 
similarities and differences of these women will lead us to a measure of “reciprocal 
illumination”, a term Arvind Sharma uses to express the ability of comparison to 
illuminate otherwise unseen or unnoticed aspects of each component of the comparison.  
What drew me to these two women were their similarities; they both grew up in Post-
Maoist China and currently both consider themselves Christians.  From this starting point 
of similarity, I would like to compare and contrast their lives to see what differences 
emerge.   
‘Religion’ while growing up 
The two women with whom I have been talking, Wei and Xiao, both grew up in 
China in the Post-Mao era.  The women experienced similar first contact with the ideas of 
religion; they both remember learning and thinking that religion was both destructive and 
entirely for the weak.  When speaking about her family, Xiao said, “We grew up being 
educated that there is no god, we should not be controlled by anything other than 
ourselves, and we should be the owner of our own lives”.  When I asked Wei about what 
she knew about religion while growing up in China, she said: 
 It is not easy for the Chinese to accept religion and have patience 
to listen to religious talking. Because the Chinese government does not 
encourage religious activity, we believe that religion is connected to 
superstitious thoughts.  In China, we think the theory of religion makes 
people believe something that does not exist.  It [religion] is bad 
because it makes so many people act so "foolish".  The Communist 
party government makes us believe in ourselves or believe in the party, 
if we believe in god, it's like we admit that we are incomplete, we are 
weak, we are foolish, we are different people, and we don't want other 
people to think we are like that.    
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She added that it is often through the use of media in China that religion is seen as 
having a negative effect on people, and usually the people who are religious are portrayed 
by the media as having little or no education.  She said,  
Religion is thought to be connected to superstitious activity because 
the media often says in some areas of China, people believe in "god", 
they don't go to the hospital when they get sick, they don't believe in 
science; they ask for rain, ask for help with the future by going to 
temples.  So to us religion is connected to non-education. When I was 
in China, I knew that there are many underground churches in the 
countryside, so I believed only non-educated people believe in religion 
so easily (because most of people in countryside don't have chance to 
be educated).  
 
We can see that, for both women, their earliest encounters with the idea of 
religion was that it was only for people who were not strong enough to survive the world 
on their own or for people who did not know better than to believe in superstitious ideas.  
It is interesting to note how growing up in Communist China, these women’s experiences 
directly reflect the Marxist ideology of the time.  Karl Marx wrote, “Religion is the self-
consciousness and self-feeling of man who has either not yet found himself or has already 
lost himself” (Marx, 41). These women were taught that they should be trusting in the 
Communist Party and themselves, certainly not god or any religion.  As a result of their 
early contact with the notion of religion, neither woman ever really had any interest in 
any religion until they left China, Xiao for Korea and Wei for the United States.  
Motives and Circumstances of becoming ‘Christian’ 
Xiao said she actually never even thought about religion or god until she was 
about 22 years old and went to study in Korea.  The University in which she was enrolled 
was a Christian school founded by an American missionary.  At the time, she was not 
being funded by any scholarships and thus having to pay for everything herself left her 
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with very little money.  She recalls attending meetings for a Christian group because she 
was so poor and “was always hungry”.  The Christian Bible study provided a free meal 
for the attendees.  Before eating, everyone would pray.   During prayer time, at first Xiao 
wasn’t too interested in what was going on, she was mostly there for the food.  But one 
day she recalled saying to God, “Well if you can make all these other people believe in 
you, let’s see if you can make me”.  To Xiao, it was more in jest that she was saying this 
than that she really thought there was a god or that anything would come of it.   The next 
day a woman approached her and asked if she wanted to study the Bible together.   Xiao 
was caught off guard and looking back she is certain that this was God’s way of reaching 
out to her; one day she was praying to God asking him to help her believe and the next 
day something happened to her that opened her up to becoming a Christian.  She says she 
was very intrigued with the Bible as “she couldn’t believe that there was one book so 
many people were interested in”.  It was through the Bible study with that woman that 
Xiao eventually became interested enough in Christianity to be baptized. 
What initially attracted Wei to a church seems to be very similar to Xiao’s 
situation, namely she was having problems in her life and she thought that going to 
church could potentially help.  Wei was having a difficult time being a study abroad 
student and she felt like she needed support.  Although she was introduced to Christianity 
in China through a relative who lived in Taiwan, she never considered becoming a 
Christian until she moved to the United States.  She said, 
 After I came to the United States, I went through a lot of difficulties in 
my personal life, in my studies and in finding jobs.  Three years ago when 
I was in deep depression, I got through it by exercising every night after 
school. I told myself that I didn’t need any religion to help me.  I did not 
rely on alcohol or drugs, or a psychiatrist at all.  But you know, as an 
international student, we go through many tough moments, such as 
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financial problems, visa status, discrimination (true or false), language 
barrier, so that even a tiny little thing can destroy our faith in life.  I often 
have thoughts about how I can handle those difficulties by myself 
everyday, I thought I was helpless.  I started to go to church last June, 
trying to make some friends.  I went to church one Sunday and happened 
to find my pastor’s relative's name on the bulletin and that he was going to 
host a seminar in Cedarville (Chinese Christian group's summer meeting).  
I spent a whole three days at Cedarville College, attended as many 
seminars as I could, and I felt that I wanted to be part of it.  It's like 
someone pushed me to make that decision. I decided to be baptized in 
November.   
 
We can see that, for both Xiao and Wei, their original motivations for attending 
meetings or church had very little to do with any ‘religious’ desires and much more to do 
with the how the meetings could help them meet secular needs.  Xiao was hungry, Wei 
wanted to find friends.  We should note that what caused both women to be attracted to 
these gathering is in line with the Durkheimian idea of religion being functional, in that it 
is less about being connected to some divine being and more about helping people 
function in the world.    
Interestingly, for both women, upon attending and becoming familiar with the 
church and Bible studies, they both moved toward desiring something more than 
fulfilling their original needs.  For Wei, although what originally drew her to the church 
in the beginning was the desire to find friends, it seems in the end what kept her going 
back had very little to do with the friends she made.  In fact, when discussing with me her 
experiences with her church, she rarely talked about how the people she met became her 
friends.  When she discussed with me the people in her Bible study, she mentioned one 
woman who actually made her quit attending her group for a while due to a disagreement 
they had.  But even when Wei was no longer a part of the group (she is now back 
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attending on a weekly basis) she was not at all discouraged about her identity as a 
Christian and her desire to “continue to pray and be connected with god”.   
 
Consequences of Becoming Christian 
After discussing with me growing up in China and how they became Christians, 
both women told me how becoming a Christian had changed their lives.  Xiao said that 
before she became a Christian, she doubted everything, as to her the world was constantly 
changing.  She thought that “nothing was deserving of her effort, as one day it could be 
true and then the next could be proven wrong”.  She couldn’t really bring herself to put 
all her energy into anything as she didn’t trust that what she was putting so much effort 
into was worthwhile.  But upon reading the Bible and becoming a Christian, she said “I 
feel like I found the absolute truth” and “a personal savior”.   She said that her view of 
life and the world has changed; she is very happy now and has a grateful heart.  She said 
she does not feel she deserves what God has given her.  “I am always happy now, nothing 
will be a real problem anymore” as God can both help her and support her.    
Happiness is also something Wei discussed feeling after converting to Christianity.  
She said,  
After the Cedarville trip, I found myself changed gradually. I became 
more positive. (I used to be a very negative person my whole life). I 
now have positive views on many things and I have more faith in 
myself and in others. At the same time, someone I only talked to twice 
during the Cedarville trip invited me to church, to join their group, and 
I thought it was also a sign that I need to do it.  Not long after baptism, 
my [work] position became a full-time position after 8 months of part-
time. I felt that it was "love" that made me change, to make me feel 
joyful in life, and make other people change their view about me.  I 
felt that if I knew God earlier, the ups and downs in my life wouldn’t 
have hurt me so much.  I am now capable of handling it much better 
than before.   
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Later she said  
Being a Christian I stopped being jealous.   I think jealousy is 
normal for human beings.  I feel a lot less jealousy now because it 
hurts.  As I realize it is a sin and it hurts, I start to wish other people 
doing good, this make myself feel good too.  Why should I be jealous, 
I ask myself, no matter how hard I try, I still can not get what I 
want.  It hurts because it reminds me every time that I am not as good 
as others.  But this is not true.  God created us for a reason.   We ARE 
different.  I should enjoy what I have and who I am.  I became positive 
about myself.  I try to avoid negative things that affect my mood, I 
really do.  So I became happier, and do not worry about how people 
judge me, do not worry about what job I am doing, how much I earn, 
because I am who I am, I have tried my best. 
 
Besides these positive aspects that their new role as Christians played in their 
lives, both women also found new obstacles.  In looking at their responses to these 
obstacles, I think we can see some differences in their thinking emerge.  At the time Xiao 
became a Christian, she was dating a man who is now her husband.   He was not 
interested in religion and this became a serious problem for them in their relationship.  
When Xiao told her husband that God could support them he said “you shouldn’t trust 
God, you should trust me”.  She told me “I could not bear that the one I love would go to 
hell” so she kept pushing for him to explore it more.  Eventually, her husband realized if 
he didn’t try, they would not have a future together, so he began going to church with 
Xiao.  Although they are now attending a church together, he is still not too interested in 
becoming a Christian.  Xiao seemed comforted by his effort.   
Through Xiao’s explanation of why she wanted her husband to become a 
Christian, we can see that she views Christianity as the only way for one to go to heaven, 
and all others will to go to hell.  Even someone who Xiao loves deeply and knows is a 
good person will not have a chance to go to heaven unless he attends church.  But for 
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Wei, the idea that there is only one ‘right’ religion makes her uncomfortable.  She said “I 
do not object to other religions.  I understand other people's needs, just like mine.  This is 
the difference between other people in the fellowship, some of them object to other 
religions violently”.  Wei, unlike Xiao does not feel as if there is just one religion, one 
right way to view the world.  She never talked about finding an absolute truth like Xiao 
did, it seemed she was more comfortable talking about the positive aspects for her 
individually in becoming a Christian.   
 Also for Wei, unlike Xiao, the Bible did not play a large role in her understanding 
of Christianity.  She said,  
About Christianity, I have not read the bible very much.  I know our 
God is the God of love and joy.  We should get together to worship 
God. We should pray hard, prayer is very effective.  We should always 
have faith in God and God knows everything.  I just simply follow 
these and they make my life simple and joyful.  Since this is the 
relationship between God and me, I do not need to worry about what 
other people think of me. For me, Christianity is as simple as love and 
sharing.   
 
For Xiao, it was learning about the Bible and studying the Bible that finally brought her 
to want to become a Christian.  She “felt overwhelmed by the wisdom of God’s word” 
and through reading the Bible, “felt her heart was set free”.   
I asked both women how their friends and family reacted back in China when 
they told them they were Christians.  Xiao said her mom, who is usually very gentle 
became extremely angry with her and actually shouted.  But then “after they saw how it 
had changed me, they were very happy for me”.  Originally Xiao thought there were very 
few Christians in China but upon returning, she realized that there are actually a lot of 
Christians living in China but that they are under persecution by the Chinese government 
and thus are more underground about their beliefs.   
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Wei recalls that after she became a Christian, when telling people back home that 
she was a Christian, she received numerous different responses including "are you sure?",  
"enjoy whatever you’ve got, because life is so short", and one of her friends said "so you 
belong one organization now?” as though it is similar to joining the Communist party.  
One of her friends asked "do you really feel comfortable doing it?” insinuating that to 
them it appeared like people in the church had pushed her to that decision.  Wei also 
discussed how often times in China, if people do not agree with what you are doing, they 
will just keep silent about it, but she could tell some people were thinking “that poor 
woman finally had to rely on religion” or “she is in something that she cannot get out of”.  
Wei said she knew people were having these thoughts because when she was living in 
China if the same situation had occurred, she would be thinking the same things as well.   
Although there are people in China who might regard Wei as weak, she is content 
with her life and her choice to become a Christian.  
 I am happy to tell people that I AM WEAK.  I feel fine with it because I 
started thinking like a Christian.  Gradually I unloaded my burdens, let 
God lead my life, I believe God will show me the right things to do.  I 
enjoy my life now instead of worrying about the future.  I understand 
many things in life are out of my control, so I’d rather not worry about 
it.  If there is not God to lead me, I might end up like a crazy woman 
with no hopes, no friends.   
 
 Xiao places similar emphasis on allowing God to lead her through life.  When I 
asked her if she was planning on staying in the United States or returning to China, she 
said she would be happy staying in the US but “if I am called to go back to China then I 
wouldn’t mind”.  We can see from her language that she doesn’t feel it will be a decision 
that she makes, what God leads her to do, she is happy to oblige.  
The complexity of ethnography 
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I am very grateful to these women for the opportunity to talk with them.  But 
unfortunately, I feel I have only just begun to amass information.  All the above work is 
based solely on what they said; I was never able to attend church or Bible study with 
them, and thus was never able to be the participant observer that is so important in 
fieldwork.  Because of my limited research, there are aspects of this comparative paper 
that are problematic.  One of these problems is in the use of the term ‘Christian’ and 
‘Christianity’.  Both Wei and Xiao belong to foreign churches, Xiao attends a 
predominantly Korean church and Wei a predominantly Chinese church.  For both 
women, what ‘kind’ of Christianity they are involved in was never an important part of 
their stories.  And being that I never attended church with either woman, I still do not 
know with whom their churches have affiliations.  Therefore, throughout this essay, when 
using the terms ‘Christian’ and ‘Christianity’, I knew it was problematic to do so in such 
an ambiguous way, but due to my limited knowledge, I was unable to correct the 
situation.   
This brings me to what I would argue is the most important aspect of 
ethnographic fieldwork, the time commitment to the research.  Most anthropological 
ethnographies require at least a year of fieldwork.  I now understand why.  People are 
very complex and their situations are usually just as or even more complex.  In order to 
have adequate information to write about people and their situations, much time is 
needed.  For this undergraduate thesis, because I am currently in graduate school, the 
time I spent researching was not sufficient.  Fieldwork is not something that can or 
should be a side project and unfortunately in my situation it became just that type of 
project.  In this respect, I am not satisfied with the product.  I am left wondering what 
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other information would have been important to my thesis and if I had had the 
opportunity to attend church or Bible study with them, would I have observed something 
that would allow for more insight into what they said?  I am also curious if having more 
information on the women would have made it easier or more difficult to compare them.   
The Utility of Differences in Comparison  
While I was talking and e-mailing with these women, I must admit that I began to 
have a sense of dread about having them be the topics of my comparative paper.  I 
realized, similar to what I wrote in the first part of this thesis, that a large part of my 
suspicion and hesitancy toward comparison is similar to Geertz in the dislike and distrust 
of focusing on similarities.  As Segal phrases the problem, “[T]he notion that the essence 
of what it means to be human is most clearly revealed in those features of human culture 
that are universal rather than in those that are distinctive to this people or that is a 
prejudice we are not necessarily obliged to share” (Segal, 343).    
Subscribing to this Geertzian way of thinking, I view humans as not only having 
differences, but significant differences as well.  I did not want to contribute to comparing 
people for the purpose of universalizing.  I originally thought that as I compared these 
women, they would both become concretized in a completely inaccurate way.  I thought 
this would occur just because I was taking what they said and writing it down 
comparatively.  I did not want these women’s experiences or my portrayal of these 
women’s experiences to be seen as some conclusive statement or as being capable to 
speak for a broader field of people.   
But what I found was when I began the writing was that the comparative structure 
allowed me to highlight the differences of the women and thus I was able to reveal the 
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complexity of their situations.  In comparing what the women said, I was able to see them 
in relation and perhaps understand them differently than if I had just focused on one 
woman.  Often what would happen when talking with one of the women was that our 
topic of conversation would later help stimulate questions that I could ask the other.  For 
example, I am not sure if I would have asked Xiao what her family and friends said about 
her Christianity if Wei had not brought up how her friends reacted.  In this way, I really 
view the comparison as aiding the exploration of the women much more so than I 
originally would have thought.  I am still unclear if the comparative structure was helpful 
because I was not able to amass adequate information about the women and thus needed 
a comparative framework to give me something to do.   
Text-based Comparison 
 For the textual based comparison I wanted to continue with the theme of women 
who grew up in China during the Mao era.  For this comparison, the main focus will be 
on two autobiographical texts written by women about their experiences growing up 
during the Cultural Revolution.   Naihua Zhang and Xiaomei Chen are two women who 
grew up in urban China during the Mao era and who both currently reside in the United 
States.  Naihua Zhang is an assistant professor at Florida Atlantic University, her research 
interests are contemporary women’s movements and women’s organizations in China.  
Xiaomei Chen, at the time this book was published was an associate professor at the Ohio 
State University in the Department of Comparative Studies.   
The texts I will be comparing are the memoirs these women contributed to Some 
of Us, Chinese Women Growing Up in the Mao Era, edited by Xueping Zhong, Wang 
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Zheng, and Bai Di.  The women who contributed to the book see their memoirs as 
important contributions to a broader understanding of the Mao era,  
We want to explore the necessarily more complex dimensions of 
issues raised and debated in recent scholarship on how to assess and 
understand twentieth-century China and, especially, the Mao 
era…Through exploring the various intersections between “official 
ideology” and “lived experience”, we want our stories not only to 
“enrich and complicate” the existing understanding of that era but 
also to open further discussion of the Mao era and, by extension, its 
relationship to China’s century-long quest for modernity (Zhong, 
xvii).   
 
Because Zhang and Chen both grew up during the Mao era, both agree that the 
memoirs depicting that time period in China, especially for women during the Cultural 
Revolution, are limited in scope, these women’s memoirs make a great comparative case 
study.      
In a World Together Yet Apart 
Naihua Zhang, in her essay “In a World Together Yet Apart, Urban and Rural 
Women Coming of Age in the Seventies”, focuses a lot on her relationships with two 
women she met while working in a small village in northeast China.  Her experience 
during the Cultural Revolution seems different from the other memoirs I have read in that 
she really seemed to enjoy her years working in the field.  She begins her story in 1966 
when she was a popular student at an all-girls elite middle school in Beijing.  When it 
was discovered that her father held a position considered capitalistic, her status quickly 
fell and she severely felt the discrimination of her peers.  Zhang’s harshest memory of 
this discrimination came when, although she was selected by her classmates to participate 
in the 1968 National Day in Tiananmen Square, she was denied by the school’s 
committee based on her father’s background.   Her feelings toward her classmates and 
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peers were filled with sadness and the realization that perhaps no one would ever trust her 
again.  She explains: 
It was with this deeply buried sense of doubt and hopelessness 
about my future that I left Beijing on March 22, 1969, boarding a 
train with four classmates to begin our long journey to a remote 
village in the Manchura township of Momoge in Zhanlai County, 
Jilin Province, in northeast China.  I was seventeen years old 
(Zhang, 5).    
 
Life on the farm was hard for Zhang but it did not take her long to adjust, 
especially to the villagers’ hospitality.  Zhang recalls that it was refreshing to be judged 
by her skills on the farm and not by her father’s occupation:   
This incident made me realize that the villagers did not really care 
what my family class origin was when evaluating my work, nor 
were their views easily swept by the quickly changing political 
winds (Zhang, 7).      
 
It was this sort of non-political treatment from the villagers that allowed Zhang to 
begin to heal from the discrimination she experienced in Beijing.  Zhang, unlike many 
others, feels thankful for how the people in the village treated her and made her feel 
welcome:    
In some memoirs or literary works, zhiqing are portrayed as victims 
of corrupt local officials, and the period in the countryside is seen as 
a waste of time in their lives.  I have always felt a deep sense of 
gratitude and nostalgia toward the people in my village, a place I 
devoted a full eight years of my youth and from which I have also 
gained much in return (Zhang, 7).    
 
For Zhang, the most important aspect of the time she spent in the countryside was 
the relationships she built with two women from the countryside, Guirong and Lifeng.  
These two women not only showered Zhang with affection and generosity but also 
through their close relationship allowed Zhang to recall this period in her life as being 
happy:  “Yes, we encountered many difficulties and endured hardships, but, all in all, we 
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were happy” (Zhang, 13).  Zhang recalls their attitudes of the time as being ready for any 
challenge and extremely enthusiastic about the opportunity to help explore new farming 
techniques to help the countryside residents of China:  “I was a true believer in scientific 
farming as the way to improve productivity and the standard of living for peasants and 
felt that I could contribute to this end” (Zhang, 19).  Also in contrast to other memoirs, 
where this time period is seen as a waste of time and energy, Zhang credits her ability to 
have such a great experience in the countryside to the special time period created by the 
Cultural Revolution:  “The specific time and circumstances under which we lived 
provided opportunities for us to engage in a variety of activities and made our experience 
fulfilling, enriching, and empowering” (Zhang, 13).    
Throughout her time at the farm, Zhang was conscious about the differences of 
her being a zhiqing (educated youth from an urban context) and her farmer friends, but it 
was not until she began preparations to leave the countryside that the full force of these 
differences became reality.  In her story, she is very clear about the fact that being a 
zhiqing from the city allowed her many privileges; at first she only saw these in terms of 
benefits she received from being in the countryside, but as the Cultural Revolution died 
down, she realized that her ability to move about and to get a job to support herself back 
in the city was completely different then what the future held for her best friends.  
Besides the special relationships Zhang made during her time in the countryside, 
she also writes about what it meant to be a girl during that period (i.e. both a child and a 
female).  Looking back and thinking about that question, she realized “that unlike family 
class origin or zhiqing, gender was an aspect that I was quite unconscious of in my 
youth” (Zhang, 14).  A very famous quote from Mao Zedong at the time was: “Time has 
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changed.  Men and women are the same.  Whatever men can do, women can do too” 
(Zhang,15).   It was this kind of thinking that appears to have made Zhang and some of 
the other authors in this book forget about gender during their time in the countryside.  In 
school and at home, Zhang was never made to feel different from or inferior to boys.  
What was stressed and important, she writes, was how good of a student one was, not 
their gender.   
Zhang was elected to leadership positions all throughout school, and recalls that it 
was not uncommon for girls to hold these positions.  It was not until she became the 
target of class discrimination that her leadership roles were taken from her.  Again, the 
discrimination was due to political reasons, not ones related to her gender.  Then later, 
when she was working on the farm, she also held numerous leadership roles and she and 
her two friends often did the most strenuous work, which had before always been seen as 
men’s work.   Besides never feeling held back by her gender, Zhang sees Mao’s saying 
on equality as having a large impact on her gender identity and how she viewed 
femininity:  “I was actually quite “ignorant” about my body and the traditional sense of 
femininity” (Zhang, 15-16).   It was not until after the Cultural Revolution when she 
overheard a woman complaining about how the countryside had ruined her shape that 
Zhang realized the concept of “shape” existed.  Interestingly, Zhang writes about how 
during that time, she did not have any sense of “women as a category” (Zhang, 16) as she 
does now.  The housewives that she got to know in her village had many sufferings, but 
Zhang always felt that they were class sufferings and never felt connected to these 
women through being a woman:   
I viewed their sufferings as all rooted in the economic backwardness 
of the countryside, which I thought I was helping to eradicate 
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through my work at the experimental farm.  It never occurred to me 
that they and I were all connected as women (Zhang, 16).        
 
Another aspect of gender that Zhang recalls from living in China’s northeast 
during the Cultural Revolution was that the big distinction between a girl and a woman.  
This transformation took place when a girl married, and her status seemed to drop 
immediately.  An unmarried girl had a certain status in her own household, but as soon as 
she married she became part of her husband’s family, and usually had the lowest status in 
that family.  Zhang uses a Chinese saying to illustrate this point “it would be the end of it 
if a girl marries” (nude yi jiehun jiu wanle) (Zhang, 17).   Not only did the woman’s 
status change, but she was usually given the most amounts of work as well as the 
toughest jobs around her new household.  After marriage, she was only referred to as “so 
and so’s wife”, her own name no longer of any importance.   
Zhang writes about how her countryside friends desperately wanted to have her 
freedom of being from an urban setting and being able to hold a paying job instead of 
being dependent upon marriage for success.  But during Zhang’s time at the farm, she 
stresses that none of them were thinking about such things as marriage, “it seemed to be 
too early and embarrassing to even think about such personal matters as marriage and 
dating” (Zhang, 18).   
The first time Zhang felt any gender discrimination herself was in the mid 1980s 
after the Cultural Revolution was well over.  The discrimination had to do with marriage.  
Without even knowing it, Zhang had become part of a “social problem” in China.  Hu 
Yaobang, the Communist Part Secretary at the time identified the problem that a lot of 
men and women who had lived through the Cultural Revolution were still single in their 
late twenties and early thirties, and asked organizations to help match them together.  At 
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this time, the image of an ideal woman changed, often leaving those who excelled during 
the Cultural Revolution without an adequate match.  The men seemed to be looking for 
younger women who were less educated and thus not a threat to them or their 
intelligence, whereas the women wanted an equal match.  Zhang recalls often being 
asked by her friends and family if she had solved her personal problem (geren wenti), 
meaning it was problematic for her not to be married.   
The last thing Zhang addresses in her story is the great division between people 
from the city and people who lived in the countryside.  Not just their location and living 
conditions differed, but also their opportunities.  For Zhang, being a zhiqing enhanced her 
ability to move about and to attain employment for herself, whereas Guirong and Lifeng, 
due to relocating laws, were unable to move anywhere and thus unable to provide 
themselves new and better opportunities.  
From “Lighthouse” to Northeast Wilderness 
In Xiaomei Chen’s essay, “From “Lighthouse” to the Northeast Wilderness”, she 
begins her story when she is in the United States.  She stresses how living abroad not 
only gave her new experiences and new opportunities but it also allowed her to reflect 
upon and to see her experiences growing up in the Mao era through new perspectives:   
To recover an affirmative experience in China, therefore, is not to 
dismiss an equally positive experience of living outside China, 
where global perspectives provided me with a unique way of 
valuing my own culture, no matter how negatively it had been 
portrayed in scholarly works and the popular media (Chen, 55).    
 
She talks about how she struggled with other memoirs written by women who 
grew up in the Mao era, for example Wild Swans, and how when she was a professor and 
teaching the book at the Ohio State University she often felt as if she was becoming part 
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of the China bashing that had become commonplace in the West.  To counterbalance all 
the negativity, she began to recount the positive aspects of growing up in China to her 
students, trying to allow for both multiple perspectives of the Cultural Revolution and 
also to portray the happy memories she had of her childhood.  She writes about how in 
teaching her students these different points of view she often felt that the critical 
perspective she was attempting to portray got lost in either her emotions or in the striving 
to keep the attention of college freshmen.  Therefore, the point of this essay for Chen is to 
try and find an honest and balanced perspective:   
Thus, my goal, in this brief memoir and elsewhere, is to arrive at a 
balanced perspective that can honestly reflect my native experience 
and, in so doing, both affirm and interrogate that experience” (Chen, 
56-7).    
 
What is interesting about Xiaomei Chen is that she chooses to focus on very 
different aspects of the time period.  She writes,  
While I had many of the same experiences recollected in this 
anthology, such as that of being a qingnian (youth), funu (woman), 
and a zhiqing (educated youths living in rural China, full of the 
spirit of wusi [selflessness]), I want to focus on my experience as 
the daughter of two luminaries of the theater, who at times filled 
me with pride and other times mortified me, depending on where I 
was and the circumstances (Chen, 56).    
 
Chen’s working through the dichotomy of celebrity and commoner is a clear 
theme throughout her memoir.  She says that she could feel comfortable in both positions, 
playing the role of having an elite background as well as identifying with the ‘common’ 
people: “These dual identities often provided me with a sense of security that allowed me 
to function at my best” (Chen, 57).   
Because Chen focuses on her parents’ careers and how their status affected her 
growing up, much of her memoir takes place around performances, both her parents’ 
 44
performances as well as the role performance played in shaping her experiences during 
the Cultural Revolution.  Throughout the text, Chen makes many references to how her 
parents influenced her greatly in both positive and negative ways; from being ashamed of 
how they dressed, to wanting to be like them and being captivated by the stories they told 
upon returning from performing around China, all these interactions with her parents left 
her with strong impressions:   
The Maoist rhetoric that privileged the common people (for 
example, workers, peasants, and soldiers) ensured that any sense of 
elitist glory such as had once been planted in me as a child would be 
uprooted because of the contemporary insistence that an acting 
career was no more glorious than any other occupation (Chen, 59).   
 
Chen’s parents were very active in promoting the socialist ideals of equality 
among the classes.  They toured factories, mines, and rural China to not only give 
performances but also to teach the local people how to create and put on their own 
dramas:   
My parents’ passionate belief in ordinary people, and their sincere 
efforts to reform themselves into revolutionary artists, deserving of 
the working class’s trust, remain among my most prized 
impressions from the time I spent with them at the dinner table 
(Chen, 60).  
 
Chen writes that her feeling of having multiple identities (both common and elite) 
not only came from her parents’ employment and social status but also from when she 
was eleven years old.  At that time she wrote an essay that was published in a very 
popular newspaper.  The essay, entitled “Lighthouse”, described how the lights of the 
Forbidden City, across the lake from the bus she rode home everyday, would sparkle at 
night and she imagined Chairman Mao writing by these lights his next brilliant plans for 
the Chinese people.  She wrote how she thought it was by these guiding lights that 
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millions of Chinese were doing miraculous work in the name of China all across the 
country.   The essay was an instant hit.  When she became famous after the publication, 
her peers turned against her and accused her of cheating, thus somewhat isolating her 
from her classmates.  She notes that this did not have too much of an effect on her as,  
Growing up in Maoist China, I had been taught to admit my own 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses by being open and receptive to the 
criticisms of others.  Both at home and at school, I had been taught 
the value of sincerity and humility (Chen, 64).   
 
Thus, once again we can see the idea that, for Chen, even when one stands out 
from their peers they still have their own weaknesses, and for the sake of keeping 
everyone at the same level, these weaknesses should be pointed out.  Besides learning 
humility and the need for self and peer criticism, Chen also writes about the need to “trust 
the masses”.  In order to be a good leader, Chen thinks that one cannot be seen as 
anything different or above those they are leading.   What we can see at work again in 
these situations is the duality and tension of being the same as those around you while at 
the same time, standing out from crowd as a special individual.   
Chen, when writing about her childhood, says, “I can honestly say I had a happy, 
even an exhilarating childhood, although I was not spared some growing pains” (Chen, 
57).  Chen’s happy times included dancing as a part of her school’s welcoming team.  
She then describes how heartbreaking it was to be taken off the list once the Cultural 
Revolution started and her father’s past was investigated.  Besides being kicked off the 
dance team, Chen was also denied multiple times for membership in the propaganda team 
formed to spread Mao Zedong thought.  Nonetheless, she had such an appetite for 
performing and actively contributing to the politics of the times that she went home and 
with other children in her neighborhood, children whose parents were also being 
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investigated, formed their own performing group.  The group worked really hard, 
sometimes staying up all night to prepare a new performance elaborating on a new quote 
by Chairman Mao.  She spent so much time practicing and performing with the group 
that it became central to her childhood and her childhood dreams:   
I view my xuanchuandui days today as one of the most exciting 
times of my adolescence, when fun and duty intertwined so well as 
to render perfectly natural my role of little player in the larger 
scheme of political theater (Chen, 68).    
 
In 1968, Chen’s life changed drastically with another new saying from Mao, this 
one revolving around youths from the city going to the countryside to become “re-
educated by the peasants”.  Although Chen was one year younger than the minimum age 
requirement, she insisted upon going, thinking it was a great opportunity for her group to 
perform in a new part of China.  “I was ready to join my teammates in the Beijing train 
station and looked forward to our going together to the wilderness to spread our 
performing tradition” (Chen, 70).  But shortly after the train pulled out of the station, 
Chen realized that her troupe no longer existed; she was told they were no longer children 
together in a troupe, but instead, now adults waiting to be told their assignments in the 
field.  She continued to hold onto to the idea that when they reached their destination they 
could be reunited, but she was dropped off was hundreds of miles from any of her group 
members; she writes, “I was devastated” (Chen, 71).  The team, which had been central 
to Chen’s identity, did not survive the move to the countryside.  “Until then, my team, 
which defined my very existence, had seemed more important to me than my family” 
(Chen, 71).  Her desire to perform did not end with the break up of her troupe, and she 
writes that she spent much time in the fields dreaming about the opportunity to perform 
again.   
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For Chen, life on the countryside consisted of working both on the farm and in the 
dining hall, where she was able to put to use her writing skills by evaluating her peers’ 
accomplishments.  Eventually, her ability to write led to her spending her final two years 
at the farm reporting.  She would travel around and report about different people and their 
experiences, thus still maintaining a fluid identity, living among many different types of 
people but still using her own writing skills to write the stories.  She also tells about her 
experience of playing the morning crow is some village plays, and performing the sound 
so well that she actually achieved a bit of celebrity status due to it.  She recalls that being 
able to perform such a minor part and still be recognized for her ability fulfilled a lot of 
her needs for performing. 
Chen concludes that,  
While I would not deny the sometimes dispiriting effect on me of 
back-breaking labor and my longing to return home, I can still say 
that spiritually and emotionally I was not as devastated as many 
authors of Cultural Revolution memoirs would have us believe 
everyone was (Chen, 74).      
 
In a Lighthouse Together yet Worlds Apart 
As noted in the introduction of the book, an interesting aspect of writing memoirs 
is how memory is connected with history.  For these women, their memories of their 
experiences during the Cultural Revolution vary greatly.  These differences allow for the 
complexities and variety of experiences for people growing up during the Cultural 
Revolution to be emphasized.  For Zhang, as she recollected her past, what stood out the 
most were the relationships that she made, and then her reflections on gender equality, 
and what zhiqing meant for her in an opportunistic way.   For Chen, when she was 
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recollecting the Mao era, she recalled most strongly her own struggle to balance the ideas 
of being “common” while at the same time often excelling more than her peers.  
We can also see that for both of these women Maoist rhetoric played an important 
part in shaping their thoughts at the time, and also aided them in looking back and 
evaluating their experiences.  For Zhang, Mao’s idea of sexual equality can be seen at the 
center of her developing little to no sense of gender identity.  In school and on the farm, 
what mattered was ability and hard work, not if you were male or female.  For Chen, her 
performing troupe was constantly being influenced and centered their performances on 
new sayings from Mao.  It was Mao’s idea of reeducation that sticks out as most 
influential in her upbringing as it with that saying that Chen moved to the countryside 
and her life changed drastically.   
Although both women were labeled as elitists and had to go to the countryside, 
the difference between classes, or urban and rural China, seemed to have a much greater 
impact on Chen than on Zhang.  Zhang never spoke about any personal “movement” 
between the classes; it appears that since she was able to fit in so well in the countryside, 
besides the fact that she was granted more opportunities in life, she felt there were no 
other differences between her and her friends.  But for Chen, she consistently talks about 
dual identities and paradoxical desires: “Thus I learned early to shift among multiple 
identities” (Chen, 61).  She focused on how wanting to trust the masses and 
acknowledging that she was in fact the same as everyone always seemed to be in contrast 
to her desire to perform and hold a certain privileged position due to her exceptional 
work.    
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In working through a text based comparison, I understand how comparison can be 
“reciprocally illuminating” insofar as by comparing and contrasting these women’s 
experiences, I think I do understand better the intricacies of their situations.   For me, in 
this context, comparison seems a great tool for exploring, or in fact, even discovering, the 
differences and complexities of each woman’s story.   
The Relationship of Fieldwork and Textual Analysis to Comparison 
 
 I discovered through writing these two comparative essays that comparing texts is 
very different than comparing two living women.  One question that I posited in the 
introduction that has not really been addressed yet is do different research methods 
influence how useful and how necessary comparative methods are to the project.   What I 
want to examine is if there is any correlation between doing fieldwork and doing textual 
analysis that influences the skepticism towards comparative techniques.  Because I had 
the opportunity to try both kinds of comparative projects, it seems to me that research 
techniques can influence the usefulness and appropriateness of comparison.  In this way, 
I would argue that yes, research methods matter.   
Perhaps it is not incidental that Geertz, one of the most vigorous advocates against 
comparison, is a fieldworker.  I think in my situation, because of my time constraints and 
the fact that the information I learned about the women was limited, the comparative 
aspect of the paper gave me something ‘to do’.  But if I had had more time to spend with 
the women, and thus had more opportunities to understand more deeply each of their 
situations, I am not sure that the comparison wouldn’t have hindered my ability to 
explore each woman and each woman’s unique and multifaceted situation.  
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In a text based situation, there is much less obstruction for comparative 
manipulation and much fewer consequences.  When Jonathon Smith discusses the 
playfulness of comparative projects, in light of his usual text based comparisons, I 
understand why it is not as important for him to see the seriousness of his work.  But for 
Hugh Urban, who is a fieldworker, the idea of taking comparison lightly is unacceptable 
and thus he is highly critical of Smith.  Urban, instead of dismissing comparative projects 
as Geertz does, goes about addressing the issues involved in comparing by focusing on 
the serious implications that exist from the work.   For both Geertz and Urban, I think the 
importance of their ideas is how fieldwork effects how they view comparative projects.  
Two very strong advocates of comparative methods, Max Weber and Claude Levi-
Strauss stressed the need and utility of comparison in their work.  Weber was never an 
advocate of fieldwork, and Levi-Strauss, after spending a short time in the field, dropped 
fieldwork saying it was ‘woman’s work’ and then spent the rest of his career working 
with comparative methods.   
For me, in writing these two comparative essays the most apparent difference was 
the comfort level I had while comparing respectively the people and the texts.  After 
interviewing the women, whenever I would attempt to write something about them, I was 
constantly feeling hesitant.  There seemed to be something too concrete in taking what 
they had said and turning it into a written comparative work.  It is as if there was 
something in the comparison that could illuminate aspects of what they said in different 
ways than they had meant.  Again, I am unsure if this is because I was unable to spend a 
lot of time with the women or if it was perhaps due to the fact that I was not ready for the 
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responsibility of any serious implications of my work, but I felt very uneasy with the idea 
of comparing them.   
This seems to align me with both Geertz and Urban in that (like Geertz)I am 
uncomfortable with generalizations, but (like Urban) I am also uncomfortable not 
knowing what implications my work might have.  Even while reading Jensen’s article, 
what struck me is how if scholars were able to live in an academic bubble, and not have 
their work have any impact on the outside world, then I could see how to Jensen what we 
need is for scholars to stop reifying the idea of universals.  But then I wonder, just 
because scholars are able to understand the temporary and abstract nature of universals 
and generalizations, I am not convinced that people outside of academia would have the 
same reactions.  Therefore, what I can take away from Urban’s article is the need to 
understand that our work can potentially be used outside of academia for purposes 
beyond just mental games.  I understand the importance of being cautious of how our 
work could be construed.   
For me, these issues went away with the text based comparison.  I was not 
worried about how comparing the essays could possibly affect other people’s ideas and 
feelings toward the women.  But in doing the textual based comparison, I did not feel that 
what I was doing was comparing two women, but comparing what two women had 
written about themselves. To me, because they had already taken their stories and made 
them into a written work comparing them through writing seemed much less intrusive.  
For me, the distinction between writing a text based comparison and an ethnographic 
comparison was very important to understand how the appropriateness and utility of 
comparative techniques is influenced by research methodology.   
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 Conclusion 
 I can honestly say that what is even more rewarding than completing this thesis, is 
what I learned in process of researching and writing it.  There are three invaluable lessons 
I learned from this thesis.  First, there is room in comparative projects for the differences 
to be emphasized and through highlighting these differences a much more complex 
picture of situations can be painted.  Second, fieldwork cannot be a side project.  A 
substantial amount of time must be allotted for any ethnographic work.  And third, 
research methods are an important part of whether or not comparative techniques are 
useful in research.   
For this thesis, I began by questioning whether or not comparative methods were 
useful or appropriate when researching cultural or religion and, as I mentioned above, I 
was quite skeptical.  This skepticism continued during my research of the dialogue that 
scholars are now having as well as when I was writing my own comparative papers.  I 
learned that some of my skepticism was necessarily valid, such as to whether or not 
comparative projects had to end in universals and generalizations.  Through writing, I 
saw that comparing can actually be a great vehicle for drawing out and highlighting 
differences.     
As stated above, I encountered many difficulties in doing the ethnographic 
fieldwork, which I think occurred mostly because I was trying to have it be a side project 
at the same time I was going to graduate school.   Because of the problems I encountered 
in trying to set up meetings with the women I wanted to talk with, as well as consistently 
having scheduling problems with when they went to church, the amount of information I 
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gathered on the women, much to my dismay, was minimal.  This lack of information and 
insight into the women’s lives made me very hesitant to compare them.  Again, one 
positive aspect of the comparing was that I was able to emphasize difference and thus not 
conclude with any broad generalizations or universals.  But, after writing both 
comparative pieces, I realized that maybe it was the nature of a fieldwork-based project 
that led to my hesitancy to use comparative methods, and not the lack of information I 
had about the women.   
The question I was most interested in was in the end, am I convinced of these 
methods?   Do I find comparison “reciprocally illuminating” as Arvind Sharma does?  Or 
will I continue to be skeptical about the usefulness of the methods?  As it turns out, for 
me the answer is, of course, that it depends on the context.  In a textual analysis, I see 
there is much to be gained, and little to be lost in comparing.  But for ethnographic work, 
I am still unclear as to the utility of these methods.  I think my biggest fear of writing 
about people is to portray them in a way that is not only inaccurate but also becomes 
concretized and representative of much more than it should.  But again, I was able to use 
comparative methods to show difference and so I can see comparative methods allowing 
for more complexity and thus not allowing for such reification.    
 In my graduate research, I am focusing on globalization studies, which have, 
among many other things, begun to challenge existing concepts of the nature of 
fieldwork.  No longer does it always make sense to be in just one place, globalization 
studies focus on the mobility of culture and people, so it is no longer inherent that culture 
has to be connected to just one specific place.   I can see that as the notions of fieldwork 
change, perhaps the relations between fieldwork and comparative methods will also be 
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modified.  If fieldwork is taking place in different places with different people, then the 
project becomes comparative in nature.  It will be interesting to see how these changes 
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